I've been rap... I mean raked by Collingwood. No-one in Australia likes losing to Collingwood, especially if it's a flogging. An 'in' joke. For my vast international audience, think of the team in your favourite sports league that everyone else 'hates'. That's Collingwood in Aussie rules footy.
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| El Santa Ana, flagship of the rear squadron that I was commanding, battered and broken, with colours struck. |
But wait, I am running ahead. How did we get to that sad and sorry image? A brief introduction to the battle and the game is in order. Sensible readers will scroll ahead to the pictures; the dedicated (or silly), read on.
We wargamers can state, without hint of exaggeration or self-aggrandisement, that we know more about any period of military history than most members of the populace. Indeed, in the 'special subject' that is our main period(s) of interest we are even at that strange stage of 'the more you know the more you realise that you don't know'. That is, one realises the nuances and uncertainties of established knowledge as well as the vast gaps in one's knowledge and understanding compared with all that there is to know. The corollary, for periods or even specific actions or events about which we have not read nor studied in any detail, is that we quickly come to realise how little we know. Such was the case with the Battle of Trafalgar for me, even though it sits within my 'special subject' of the Napoleonic wars.
After Julian and I had laid out the ships, I asked him why the Franco-Spanish ships (hereafter referred to by commonly used term of the combined fleet) were in such a poor formation, the wrong setting relative to the wind and heading north. He was not certain either.
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| The layout of our table for the game. The English at left (west), moving to attack in two columns (Collingwood's lee column closest to camera, Nelson's windward further north). The combined fleet is the disordered line to the right, heading north. How did it come to this? |
Let's back-track a little.
Lead up to Trafalgar
Most readers will be aware of the summary version. Napoleon wanted to invade England. To do this he needed the French fleet to control the Channel. Admiral Villeneuve was charged with achieving this. He gathered Franco-Spanish ships from various places to use to defeat the English forces covering the Channel, but was intercepted by Nelson and summarily defeated at the Battle of Trafalgar. Meanwhile, Napoleon had given up hope of invading England and turned his Grande Armée to attack the Austrians who had declared war and advanced into Bavaria (ahead of their Russian allies), surrounding Ulm and receiving the capitulation of Mack's army two days before the Battle of Trafalgar.
As always, the detail is far more interesting.
After the breakdown of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon was preparing to invade England. He famously boasted "Let us be masters of the Channel for six hours and we are masters of the world" (cited from The 1805 Club). To achieve this, Napoleon required his navy, along with that of his then Spanish allies, since English ships attacked theirs at the Battle of Santa Maria, to distract and, preferably, defeat the main fleet of the Royal Navy. Admiral Pierre Charles Silvestre de Villeneuve’s combined fleet escaped from Toulon in March 1805, crossed the Atlantic to the West Indies to join with other French ships so as to return with a force sufficiently strong to contest the control of La Manche (the English Channel). Remaining in the West Indies until 5th June, in an attempt to deceive the English as to the true intent [and perhaps to draw them to him, I wonder?], Villeneuve eventually returned to Europe, in July 1805.
On 22nd July, the combined fleet was intercepted by Admiral Calder's western squadron at the 3rd Battle of Cape Finisterre (often called by the English 'Calder's Action'). In an indecisive engagement, which was claimed as a victory by both sides, the combined fleet lost two ships of the line captured, lost nearly three times as many crew and retreated towards Cadiz, before changing course and heading to Vigo and then Coruña / Ferrol so as to link with the ships there for the move to the Channel*.
[*An interesting aside. In the early 19thC this indecisive victory lead to Sir Robert Calder facing a court martial for not having defeated the combined fleet and then not following-up aggressively enough. By corollary, fast-forward to the early 20thC and two English admirals who lost multiple ships, including capital ships, without being able to claim victory were not censured, but were in fact promoted. Such are the changes with time, strategic situation and perhaps a true acknowledgement of the quality of the ships and leaders available.]
Unable to make for Brest due to the prevailing wind, Villeneuve instead headed south towards Cadiz, to rendezvous with further Spanish ships. Over the period since Villeneuve had returned to Europe, Napoleon was sending repeated letters, with increased levels of frustration, to his admiral "...to attack when he is superior in numbers, counting two Spanish ships for one, [...] Finally, the French admiral is to save the imperial flag from the shame of being blockaded at Ferrol by an inferior force..." (James p. 376). Discovering that his admiral had sailed to Cadiz,
In a letter of September 17, Napoleon complains of M. Villeneuve* for this, and directs his minister of marine to order the latter, with the French ships alone (“mon escadre,” not “les escadres francon-espagnols,” or “la flotte combinée”), upon a new expedition. M. Villeneuve is to proceed off Naples, and disembark, at some point on the coast, all troops on board the French ships, in order that they may join the army under General Saint-Cyr. He is then to capture the English ship of the line (Excellent 74) and Russian frigate cruising the Bay of Naples; to do all possible injury to the English; to intercept an expedition (Sir James Craig’s) which Napoleon supposes to be destined for Malta, and then to enter Toulon; where M. Villeneuve was to find everything necessary for repairing and revictualling his ships. (James p. 378)#.
*It’s notable that James refers to British admirals, captains and others by rank and name but insists on calling Villeneuve 'M. Villeneuve'.
#It should also be noted that, by this time, the Grande Armée had turned east to confront the Austrians in Bavaria and Villeneuve was aware, by the same letter, that he was being replaced by Admiral Francois-Etienne de Rosily-Mesros. Grau suggests that "It is likely that the Emperor thought Villeneuve was too shy to obey his commands and wanted to spur him, hoping it would give him a bit of this courage he seemed to be missing so much."
Napoleon's letter reached Villeneuve on 28th September, the day that Vice Admiral Lord Nelson took command of the Mediterranean fleet. James later states:
Although in M. Villeneuve’s instructions no mention is made of the Spanish fleet, it may naturally be supposed that the latter would desire to take advantage of the exit of a formidable French fleet, to effect its junction with the seven sail of the line hitherto so closely blocked up in the port of Carthagena. (p. 384–385)
Therefore, the combined fleet was sailing south from Cadiz towards the Strait of Gibraltar. How then did it end up the ‘wrong way’ around heading back towards Cadiz when the Mediterranean fleet attacked? Grau put it well:
Villeneuve, noticing the disorganization of his fleet, again ordered the formation of the line and fixed a distance of one cable length (180 meters) as the interval between the vessels. Soon, the frigates that he had sent on reconnaissance informed him about the amount of forces he would have to face. They told him 26 ships (there were actually 27) were sailing in groups and without any specific order towards his rear-guard.
With this information, Villeneuve came to the conclusion that Nelson was intending not only to overwhelm the tail of his device under the number, but also prohibit any access to Cadiz. At 8 a.m., Villeneuve commanded the fleet to wear together (turnabout) and return to Cádiz. As the battle could not be avoided, he thought it might be better to fight next to the friendliest port.
Thus, with Villeneuve 'bravely running away’ towards Cadiz we take command of a fleet where the van was now the rear, rear the van and the ‘squadron of observation’ (aka vanguard) at the new rear. Brilliant!
Set-up for the game
I mentioned in my initial post about this game that Julian has been gathering the ships for it over the past 15 years, with most of his acquisitions occurring over 2010–15. (He has desired to wargame the battle for the past 50 years, at least). During that time (the 15 years) we have tested several sets of rules, discarded most of them and settled on Grand Fleet Actions in the Age of Sail for large actions with multiple players. Having ships and rules sorted it was a matter of where and when. He and I were discussing possible games for the last quarter or so of this year and I suggested that it could be an opportune time to actually do Trafalgar. Julian has been 'blocked' recently by his increasing obsession to stage everything at a true ground scale for the scale of the models. This leads to requiring a hall or tennis court to stage Trafalgar with his 1/1000 ships. Fortunately, I was able to convince him that we'd have enough room on my table, it would have the advantages of being able to be set up and leave set up and we would not need to crawl around on the floor or hire enough tables for a large wedding.
That decided, we refreshed ourselves with the rules. Grand Fleet Actions are a simplified set of naval rules for the age of sail that retain sufficient key aspects of fighting sailing ships. Sailing is included (that may sound funny, but you would not believe the number of simplified sets that effectively remove it), the key aspects of each ship are represented by reasonable factors, there are sensible effects of firing and squadron organisation and movement to represent command and signals. They have come through for us with several tests/games over the past few years. We are using them 'out of the box' for this game, with the minor revisions of July 2013, except for a key scenario rule regarding command by squadrons, so as to suit the historic battle and formations (and we have corrected the error in the speed when running and removed the need to be in command to fire).
Both fleets were organised by squadrons; sort of for the English. In their case the two columns were formed as a battle formation to attack and to break the enemy's line in two places. While Nelson and Collingwood were commanders of the columns, Nelson gave a lot of latitude to his captains. Once again, I'll quote from James:
In consequence of the novel mode of attack adopted by the commander-in-chief, each British ship, as she bore up in line ahead, was obliged to follow in the wake of her leader until close upon the enemy’s line; her commander, then, acting up to Lord Nelson’s instructions, as contained in the memorandum at a previous page [he reproduced it in full on pp. 381–383], that no captain could do very wrong who placed his ship alongside that of an enemy, attached himself to the first Frenchman or Spaniard that crossed his path. Most of the captains had also received, on the morning of the action, Lord Nelson’s verbal directions, transmitted through the captains of the frigates, that they were to break the enemy’s line wherever they conveniently could. This, in effect, discretionary power was particularly beneficial towards the height of the battle, when the enemy’s ships, by an irregular movement from the rear to the centre, and, in some instances, from the centre and van to the rear, were every instant shifting their positions, and giving to their line, if line it could be called, a new face. (pp. 412–413)
For their part, the combined fleet had the four clearly identified squadrons of van, centre, rear and squadron of observation, but Villeneuve also afforded his captains some latitude. James cites him (from Victoires et Conquetes tome xvi., p. 169).
The enemy, says the French admiral, “will not confine himself to forming a line of battle parallel to ours, and engaging us with his cannon, where success often attends the most skilful, and always the most fortunate: he will endeavour to turn our rear, to pass through our line, and, such of our ships as he may succeed in cutting off, will endeavour to surround and reduce with clusters (pelotons) of his own. In this case a captain would do better to trust to his courage and ardour for glory, than to the signals of the commander-in-chief; who, himself engaged and covered with smoke, would perhaps be unable to make them." (pp. 387–388)
The rules measure movement and firing in units, so I produced some player aids for movement, firing and turning, to assist with this and to avoid having tape measures on the table that might disrupt the ships. We also had trays to roll our dice (only a single D10 required) for the same reason.
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| Markers for movement, firing and turning, in units. |
Opening turns
Julian and I had made the optimistic under-assessment that, with a fairly straight forward set of rules we'd get close to finishing the game yesterday, or at least make a huge 'dent' in it. Not surprisingly, we were out by a factor of two or three, but we managed a good start and a most promising opening for the English.
The photo report follows. I did not take many of the early, approach moves, being too excited, distracted or generally air-headed, so we pick up the action as Collingwood's lee column reaches the combined fleet; bang on with my command!
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| The five ships of Álava's squadron, his flagship Santa Ana second in line, as the lee squadron, with Royal Sovereign in the van close for the kill. |
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| Overview of the table. Collingwood's column can be seen all but contacting the now centre of the combined fleet's 'line'. The 'cunning plan' was to turn towards the English and 'charge' at them with three squadrons. Julian and I had convinced ourselves that this was possible, but managed to forget the effect of our terrible orientation to the wind, which Mark reminded us about. Not able to turn into the wind (for lack of speed) the van squadron and squadron of observation wore to starboard (turned right) and have come around so as to try to engage the approaching English while the centre and (due to my delay in effecting a turn), rear squadrons acted as the 'bait'. |
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| Royal Sovereign (top running nearly horizontal), having been fired on by an broadside from Santa Ana during her approach, reaches the line with Indomptable to her front, Santa Ana in her broadside. |
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| She opens up on Santa Ana and delivers a telling broadside. |
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| Here it is in slow motion with Belleisle joining in. |
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| Fougueux takes damage from Bellerophon. |
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| She (Fougueux) turns to fire back, further damaging Royal Sovereign. |
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| An overview looking north, showing the front and centre of the combined fleet at right, Collingwood's column engage in the foreground and Nelson's at top of photo, closing in. |
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| The lee column come in for the kill. |
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| Viewed from the south with smoke beginning to fill the air. The broadside is Belleisle on Santa Ana (note Spanish flag at the stern). |
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| A third attack, this time a point blank, devastating broadside from just off her bow (not quite a rake) from Royal Sovereign was enough to completely disable the already drifting Santa Ana and she struck her colours. |
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| Meanwhile, in the north, HMS Africa, ahead of Nelson's main column fired an ineffective shot at Neptuno. |
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| A closer view of the disrupted rear squadron and struck Santa Ana. |
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| Zooming further out, here come the cavalry in the form of the squadron of observation. |
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| A view from the north-east. Africa in right-front of the photo, combined fleet to the left of her and Nelson's column, Victory in the van, approaching. |
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| The same moment, moving a bit to the south. |
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| Back in Collingwood's column, HMS Tonnant has joined the piling in on Fougueux, |
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| ...with her leader Royal Sovereign. |
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| While Colossus and Achille make a ship sandwich of Pluton. |
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| Reaching the combined fleet, Victory fires her first broadside, with little effect. |
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| Africa attempts a broadside into the stern of Scipion, also with little effect. |
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| Closer in, Victory fires again, causing some damage to San Justo. She in turn received some damage from the enemy in reply. |
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| A close-up of Africa's broadside. |
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| The frigate Cornélie tries a light-weight rake on Africa and gets light weight results. |
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| Héros rakes Victory! Some damage, but not the devastating hit so sorely needed by the combined fleet. |
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| Looking from the south, so English at left combined fleet to the right. Squadron of observation at bottom right, Collingwood's column 'east to west' foreground, Nelson's beyond that. Smashed up rear squadron mixed up with Collingwood's van, centre squadron ahead of them and van squadron, heading south to join the fray. |
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| Looking north (a bit west) from behind the squadron of observation. |
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| From the north, Nelson's column at right foreground, combined fleet is the 'mass' to the left of it. |
About the game
Rules
Butler A (2013) Grand Fleet Actions in the Age of Sail Edition 2.1 (with rule revisions 3 July 2013). A and A Game Engineering. With scenario adaptations described above.
Nominal scale 2" equivalent to 100 yards.
Model ships
1/1000 Sails of Glory. Ares Games Srl.
References
Adkin, M (2005) The Trafalgar companion : a guide to history's most famous sea battle and the life of Admiral Lord Nelson. Aurum Press, London. 560 pp.
The map of the positions of ships in the fleets was used to set out the ships in the game (p. 484).
Grau. D (2013). Battle of Trafalgar. Napoleon & Empire. https://www.napoleon-empire.org/en/battles/trafalgar.php Updated December 2nd, 2024.
Referred for background to the battle.
Harrison, CY (2010–2026). Three Decks - Warships in the Age of Sail. https://threedecks.org/index.php
A website without compare, used for details of the ships, crew and armament.
James, W (1902) The naval history of Great Britain : from the declaration of war by France in 1793, to the accession of George IV. Vol. III. First Published 1822. Macmillan and Co. Ltd, London. 510 pp.
Referred for lead up to the battle, creating our 'standing orders' and a description of the progress of the action.
The 1805 Club (). 1805 Context: Why was the Battle of Trafalgar important? The Trafalgar Way. https://www.thetrafalgarway.org/1805-context
Referred for background to the battle.
It all looks very impressive James, looking forward to seeing how the next session goes!
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